REMEDIES SYMPOSIUM
ARTICLE III, REMEDIES, AND
REPRESENTATION
Andrew Coan* and David Marcus**
As articulated by the United States Supreme Court, the principal
purpose of Article III standing is to force decisions affecting large
numbers of people into the democratic process where all affected parties
are represented. 1 The logical implication of this proposition for the proper
scope of injunctive relief is straightforward. That relief must not exceed
what is reasonably necessary to remedy the particularized injury that sets
the plaintiff or plaintiffs apart from the general population. Otherwise, any
party with a cognizable injury will be permitted to invoke the judicial
power to issue broad injunctions with potentially enormous significance
for unrepresented third parties. Put simply, if Article III standing is all
about representation, then so is the proper scope of injunctive relief.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this logic. 2 Yet courts
and commentators, including the Court itself, routinely overlook or
simply ignore it. The most prominent recent examples are the universal
injunctions issued by federal district courts against President Obama’s
immigration orders and President Trump’s travel ban. 3 These injunctions
clearly went beyond what was necessary to redress the particularized
injuries of the individual plaintiffs. Yet no lower court involved in these
cases seems to have seriously considered the implications of Article III
for the proper scope of injunctive relief. 4 Even the Supreme Court, which
narrowed the injunction against President Trump’s travel ban to persons
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we are grateful to Sam Bray, Alan Morrison, and the participants in the constitutional remedies
symposium sponsored by the Center for Constitutional Law at the University of Akron School of
Law. Special thanks to Tracy Thomas for including us in the symposium.
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1. See Part I infra.
2. See Part II infra.
3. See infra notes 36 & 38.
4. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
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“similarly situated” to the plaintiffs, failed to mention Article III as a
justification for doing so. And for good reason: A majority of the justices
implicitly approved—or at least failed to disapprove—injunctive relief
well beyond what was necessary to remedy the particularized injuries of
the only plaintiffs actually before the Court.5 As the three dissenters
pointed out, persons similarly situated to the plaintiffs are, by definition,
not the plaintiffs. 6
If the representation-centered theory of Article III is correct, the
disregard for its implications at the remedial stage is alarming and
corrosive of democratic self-government. But there is another possibility.
Disregard for the representation-centered theory at the remedial stage
might reflect well-justified misgivings, ambivalence, or uneasiness about
that theory, even by the Court itself. In this brief symposium essay, we
raise and offer some preliminary reflections on this possibility, with an
eye to exploring it more fully in future work.
Our argument unfolds in three parts. Part I offers a sympathetic
reconstruction of the representation-centered theory of Article III
standing. Part II traces the logical implications of this theory for the scope
of injunctive relief and suggests how inattention to Article III limits at the
remedy stage undermines a good deal of standing doctrine’s chief goal.
Part III offers a brief, critical evaluation of the representation-based
theory. Our main goal is to raise questions: Is the Court’s theory of
representation too simplistic? Is Article III standing doctrine well-crafted
to serve the Court’s representational goals? Could it ever be so crafted? Is
remedial flexibility a useful antidote to a body of standing doctrine that
has worked itself too pure? These are all exceedingly difficult questions,
but seldom have they seemed more urgent than they do today. Nothing
less than the power, and the limits, of an independent judiciary are at
stake.

5. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017) (per curiam) (“We
leave the injunctions entered by the lower courts in place with respect to respondents and those
similarly situated, as specified in this opinion.”) (emphasis added).
6. Id. at 2090 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“But the Court takes the additional step of keeping the
injunctions in place with regard to an unidentified, unnamed group of foreign nationals abroad.).
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I. STANDING AND THE REPRESENTATION-CENTERED THEORY OF
ARTICLE III
The nuances of Article III standing doctrine are notoriously
convoluted. 7 But it rests on an ostensibly “basic” foundation—”the idea
of separation of powers.” 8 As currently elaborated, the requirements for
Article III standing flow from twin constitutionally compelled premises,
that “generalized grievances [are] more appropriately addressed in the
representative branches,” 9 and that the Constitution limits the judicial
power to “actual ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’” 10
Whether and how standing requirements serve this separation of
powers function yield complex responses, none of which has gained the
Court’s unequivocal endorsement. 11 Antonin Scalia’s representationcentered theory, however, has proven particularly influential. 12 His theory
rests on a reading of Article III that limits the judicial power to situations
involving minority interests, when political processes cannot be trusted to
offer appropriate redress for injuries. The government may anger someone
deeply when it acts unlawfully. Unless this person suffers some concrete,
particularized injury, however, the harm he or she endures a “mere breach
of the social contract,” is a “majoritarian one.” 13 In theory, everyone
whom the government represents suffers the same harm and might be
persuaded to join the first person in her anger. Politics offers the
appropriate response, for “an alleged governmental default of such
general impact” surely “would . . . receive fair consideration in the normal
political process.” 14 An abstract, “generalized grievance” arising from

7. E.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1981); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Make Sense of Supreme Court Standing
Cases – A Plea for the Right Kind of Realism, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RGTS. J. 105, 126 (2014).
8. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); see also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820
(1997).
9. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
10. John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1220
(1993).
11. See F. Andrew Hessick, The Separation-of-Powers Theory of Standing, 95 N.C. L. REV.
673, 685–701 (2017) (describing four accounts of standing’s separation-of-powers basis and
function).
12. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992);
Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 95–103 (2007) (comparing Justice
Scalia’s theory favorably to more blunt assertions of standing’s separation-of-powers moorings); id.
at 98 (identifying Scalia’s article with the Court’s decision in Lujan).
13. Scalia, supra note 12 at 894-95.
14. Id. at 896.
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governmental action is thus an “undifferentiated public interest” whose
vindication belongs to Congress and the Chief Executive. 15
A person with a concrete, distinctive injury suffers uniquely from the
government’s action. As such, she has a “minority interest” that others do
not share. 16 This injury justifies judicial involvement, since the courts are
“assigned [the] role of protecting minority rather than majority
interests.” 17 What Justice Scalia called “fair consideration” is the key to
the representation-centered theory, and thus to the courthouse door. When
the felt effects of government action are widespread, people subject to or
aware of the action may develop different preferences in response to it.
All views are represented in the political process, and only the “genuine
desires of the people,” not the preferences of one angry person, should be
“given effect.” 18 But the person with a particularized injury cannot count
on the fair consideration of his unrepresentative interests by Congress or
the Chief Executive. He is thus “entitle[d] . . . to some special protection
from the democratic manner in which we ordinarily run our socialcontractual affairs.” 19 Hence he can sue, even if his reaction to the
government action does not represent the views of the majority.
The Court has not always hewed to the representation-centered
theory explicitly or with perfect consistency, but it is as close as there is
to a theory underlying modern standing doctrine. 20 More generally, the
Court has repeatedly seconded Justice Scalia’s insistence that inattention
to standing requirements risks “the overjudicialization of the process of
self-governance.” 21 “The law of Article III standing,” the Court recently
commented, “serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to
usurp the powers of the political branches.” 22

15. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576–77.
16. Scalia, supra note 12, at 895.
17. Id. at 895.
18. Id. at 897.
19. Id. at 895.
20. E.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. 573–78; see also Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 79 F. Supp.
3d 174, 186 (D.D.C. 2015); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation,
42 DUKE L.J. 1141, 1147–48 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, In Memoriam: Justice Antonin Scalia, 130
HARV. L. REV. 22, 24–25 (2016).
21. Scalia, supra note 12, at 881. E.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997); Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).
22. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013).
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II. REMEDIAL IMPLICATIONS
The representation-centered theory of Article III standing has clear
remedial implications, a fact the Court has repeatedly recognized. 23 If a
discrete injury-in-fact authorized a lawsuit for any remedy whatsoever,
standing doctrine would discharge little more than a ceremonial function.
The channeling works its requirements do to protect political power from
judicial usurpation would fail.
Two rules of what Richard Fallon calls “remedial standing” are well
settled. 24 First, a plaintiff might have standing to sue for damages, but if
the government does not continue to subject him to “a real and immediate
threat” of injury, he cannot also seek an injunction. 25 Absent this showing,
the plaintiff “is no more entitled to an injunction than any other citizen of”
the relevant polity. 26 To allow him to obtain injunctive relief without this
showing would enlarge the federal court’s power at the expense of the
political branches, where the advocacy of the plaintiff, an ordinary citizen
with merely an “undifferentiated claim,” belongs. 27 Second, a plaintiff can
sue to redress the harm he suffers, but he cannot sue to redress different
harm suffered by others, even if related to the same government action
that injures him. 28 “The actual-injury requirement would hardly serve the
purpose . . . of preventing courts from undertaking tasks assigned to the
political branches,” the Court has insisted, “if once a plaintiff
demonstrated harm from one particular inadequacy in government
administration, the court were authorized to remedy all inadequacies in
that administration.” 29
A third rule of remedial standing, which Samuel Bray calls the
“plaintiff-protective principle,” 30 is closely related. It provides that an
injunction can do no more than what is necessary to redress the injury the
plaintiff suffers. Although the Court has not yet announced the principle,
it requires only a modest inferential step from settled doctrine. A simple
hypothetical illustrates.31 Assume that the U.S. Forest Service announces
23. E.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991, 999 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm’n to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974).
24. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on
the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21 (1984).
25. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983).
26. Id. at 111.
27. Id. at 111–12.
28. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 (1996).
29. Id. at 357.
30. Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 418, 420 (2017).
31. This hypothetical is based closely on Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
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a particular permitting process to adjudicate commercial requests to
engage in logging in national forests. On January 1, 2016, it uses this
process to grant a permit to log in Forest A. Mr. A, who routinely hikes in
Forest A, sues to challenge the lawfulness of the permitting process under
a federal land use statute. He prevails, and the court enjoins logging in
Forest A. On January 1, 2017, the Forest Service uses the same process to
issue a permit to log in Forest B. Although beloved by other nature
enthusiasts, Forest B is 1,000 miles from Mr. A’s residence, and he has
never visited it. Mr. A clearly would lack standing to sue to enjoin the
Forest B logging. 32
Now assume that, on January 1, 2017, the Forest Service issues
permits for logging in both Forests A and B. Mr. A, the Forest A habitué,
sues for an injunction to stop all logging, in both forests. Nothing of legal
relevance to standing distinguishes the first scenario from the second, just
the timing of the Forest Service’s decisions. To allow Mr. A to seek the
broad remedy would baldly conflict with the Supreme Court’s admonition
that a plaintiff has no standing to seek a remedy for an allegedly illegal
policy “apart from any concrete application that threatens imminent harm
to his interests.” 33
The doctrinal logic of the plaintiff-protective principle is simple. Its
political logic, couched in terms of the representation-centered theory, is
equally straightforward. A plaintiff may deserve a judicial remedy for his
particularized injury. But once he receives an injunction, he no longer
enjoys a “minority status relevant to the particular governmental
transgression that he seeks to correct.” 34 If the government continues with
its behavior, just not directed at him, the plaintiff has no more claim to
further injunctive relief than anyone else concerned by the exercise of
government power. At this point, he should vindicate his “majoritarian
interest” through politics, not law.
The lower courts have haphazardly heeded the plaintiff-protective
principle, notwithstanding its clear doctrinal roots and theoretical
mooring. 35 Recently, courts adjudicating the landmark executive power

32. Summers, 555 U.S. at 496–97; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502–03 (1975).
33. Summers, 555 U.S. at 494 (emphasis added).
34. Scalia, supra note 12, at 895.
35. Compare Clement v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 364 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2004);
Soto-Lopez v. New York City Civil Service Comm’n, 840 F.2d 162, 168–169 (2d Cir. 1988); Davis
v. Astrue, 874 F. Supp. 2d 856, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2012), with L.A. Haven Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius, 638
F.3d 644, 649 (9th Cir. 2011); Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 531 (6th Cir. 2008); Sharpe
v. Cureton, 319 F.3d 259, 273 (6th Cir. 2003); Virginia Soc’y for Human Life, Inc. v. FEC, 263 F.3d
379, 393 (4th Cir. 2001); McKenzie v. Chicago, 118 F.3d 552, 555 & n.* (7th Cir. 1997); Meinhold
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cases have ignored the principle altogether. In Texas v. United States, only
a single plaintiff, the State of Texas, demonstrated its standing to sue to
challenge one of President Obama’s signature immigration policies. 36 The
Fifth Circuit nonetheless upheld an injunction barring the policy’s
implementation nationwide, making no attempt to explain why the State
of Texas’s alleged injury necessitated such a broad remedy, or why other
states should benefit from an injunction without establishing their own
standing. 37 Similarly, only three states across the two travel ban cases
have demonstrated their injuries-in-fact. 38 Upholding preliminary
injunctions barring the travel ban’s enforcement nationwide, neither the
Fourth Circuit nor the Ninth Circuit bothered to reconcile the remedies
with Article III standing doctrine.39
III. A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
By now it should be obvious that the representation-centered theory
is a political process theory of the sort developed by John Hart Ely in
Democracy and Distrust. 40 At bottom, this theory holds that courts should
intervene in the political process only when that process can be expected
to malfunction systematically and not otherwise. It also offers an account
of when the political process can be expected to malfunction in this way—
namely, when its outputs concretely burden particular individuals in ways
that set them apart from the general population. Conversely, the
representation-centered theory posits that the political process can be
expected to function well when its outputs affect broad interests, whose
numbers ensure their ability to organize and assert influence in democratic
policy-making.
Not only does this theory belong to the same family of theories as
Ely’s, there are also strong substantive parallels between the two. The
main difference is that the representation-centered theory is less skeptical
of the democratic process than Ely. Where Ely thought that elected
politicians could not be trusted to fairly consider the interests of

v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1480 (9th Cir. 1994); Zepeda v. U.S. Immig. & Naturalization
Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 729 (9th Cir. 1983).
36. 809 F.3d 134, 155 (5th Cir. 2015).
37. The Fifth Circuit disposed of a challenge to the remedy’s scope in six sentences and did
not address its implications for standing doctrine. Id. at 187–188.
38. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 762 (9th Cir. 2017) (Hawaii); Washington v. Trump, 847
F.3d 1151, 1159–1160 (9th Cir. 2017) (Washington and Minnesota).
39. Washington, 847 F.3d at 1166–1167; Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 787–788.
40. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
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disfavored minorities, 41 the only systematic political malfunction the
Court recognizes is limited to decisions that single out particular
individuals. 42
There is an appealing simplicity to this theory, but that simplicity is
misleading. To state the obvious, the political process cannot always be
trusted to balance reliably and impartially the claims of competing social
interests. To the contrary, it is often skewed against large, diffuse interests
and in favor of narrow, concentrated ones. Yet the representation-centered
theory is perversely more generous to the latter than to the former. 43 It
also frequently keeps courts from hearing the claims of diffusely injured
minorities, on the ground that such claims are insufficiently
particularized, even in circumstances where the political process offers no
practical hope of redress. 44 In some of these cases, it is possible that the
democratic process is still preferable to the courts, which have their own
shortcomings. 45 But the faith in majoritarian politics undergirding the
representation-centered approach is at best naïve, at worst willfully blind
to the failings of the democratic process.
If the Court is insufficiently skeptical of the democratic process in
cases involving diffuse interests, it is insufficiently skeptical of judicial
process in cases where the requirements of Article III standing are
41. Id. at 103 (“Obviously our elected representatives are the last persons we should trust with
identification of [situations where minorities are denied the protections afforded other groups by the
representative system].”).
42. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563. (“[R]espondents had to submit affidavits or other evidence
showing, through specific facts, not only that listed species were in fact being threatened by funded
activities abroad, but also that one or more of respondents’ members would thereby be “directly”
affected . . . .”); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984) (“Neither do they have standing to litigate
their claims based on the stigmatizing injury often caused by racial discrimination. . . . Our cases
make clear . . . that such injury accords a basis for standing only to ‘those persons who are personally
denied equal treatment’ by the challenged discriminatory conduct.” (internal citations omitted));
Scalia, supra note 12, at 891–92 (“Yet the doctrine of standing clearly excludes them, unless they can
attach themselves to some particular individual who happens to have some personal interest (however
minor) at stake.”).
43. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91
MICH. L. REV. 163, 218–20 (1992) (“Some minorities are especially well-organized and do indeed
have access to the political process, including the executive branch. . . . Moreover, some majorities
are so diffuse and ill-organized that they face systematic transaction costs barriers to the exercise of
ongoing political influence.”).
44. See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 755 (denying standing of racial minority parents to challenge
tax exemptions for racially exclusionary private schools because their injuries were insufficiently
particularized); Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105–06 (1983) (denying standing of African American plaintiff to
seek injunctive relief against a municipal chokehold policy applied almost exclusively against racial
minorities and other socially marginalized persons)
45. See generally NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (emphasizing the importance of comparative
institutional analysis).
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satisfied. The reason is simple. Even in cases where a plaintiff can
demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury that sets her apart from
the general population, a judicial decision will always affect interests that
are not represented before the court. This is starkly obvious under the
existing regime in which courts routinely enable individual litigants to
obtain sweeping injunctions that apply to thousands or millions of
similarly situated individuals. But it would remain true even if the Court
faithfully extended the logic of the representation-centered theory to
scope of remedies because precedents established by individual litigants
would control all other similar cases. 46 Either way, courts are making
decisions whose effects extend far beyond the parties before the court.
This not to say that courts should always stay their hand, only that the
problem of representation can be quite thorny even in cases where every
jot and tittle of current Article III doctrine has been strictly satisfied.
In sum, the existence of a particularized injury in fact is neither
necessary nor sufficient to justify judicial intervention in the political
process. It is not necessary because, even where no party has suffered a
cognizable Article III injury, it may be practically impossible—or unduly
difficult—to vindicate some interests through the political process. It is
not sufficient because, even where some party has suffered an Article III
injury, judicial decision of that party’s claims will generally affect the
potentially conflicting interests of parties that are not effectively
represented before the court. In at least some cases, the court’s inability
to adequately consider the interests of absent parties will counsel in favor
of deferring to the political process even when the requirements of Article
III have been satisfied.
These deficiencies in the Court’s existing approach are a byproduct
of its fatally simplistic theory of representation and its failure to take
seriously the comparative nature of institutional choice. In cases where
Article III has not been satisfied, the representation-centered theory seizes
upon one shortcoming of the judiciary—that absent parties are
unrepresented—and treats this as sufficient to disclaim judicial authority
without considering whether the political process might fare even worse.
In cases where Article III has been satisfied, the representation-centered
theory seizes upon one shortcoming of the political process—its
46. See, e.g., Alan Trammell, Precedent and Preclusion, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 565 (2017)
(making this point). Even if judicial decisions set no precedent and were strictly confined to suits by
individuals with particularized injuries, challenges to government action would affect the interests of
the beneficiaries of that action, which may or may not be well represented by the government’s
defense. Think of a challenge to environmental regulations brought by industrial interests and
defended by lawyers from Scott Pruitt’s EPA.
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insensitivity to particularized interests—as sufficient to justify judicial
authority without considering whether the judiciary might fare even
worse. 47 The upshot is that the decision to exercise judicial power,
whether at the jurisdictional stage or the remedial stage, cannot defensibly
rest on the sort of neat division of institutional responsibility posited by
the representation-centered theory. A more nuanced and a more complex
comparative institutional analysis is required.
We suspect that the Supreme Court recognizes this on an intuitive
level, even if it is loathe to admit as much explicitly. This would explain
why the Court has frequently allowed individual plaintiffs in
environmental cases to pursue broad remedies whose clear purpose is to
protect the interest of the public at large. 48 Under the representationcentered theory, such remedies should be highly suspect. They clearly
implicate the interests of parties not represented before the Court, which
under the representation-centered theory, should be left to the political
process. Indeed, to the extent the plaintiff’s interest really is shared by the
public at large, the problem is not just with the remedy but with Article
III standing, which requires a particularized injury. 49
And yet, in environmental cases, there is ample reason to distrust the
political process. The public’s interest in environmental protection is
broad but diffuse, while the business and industrial interests that tend to
oppose such protection are concentrated and cohesive. 50 Basic public
choice theory predicts that the latter will often prevail over the former
even where the social benefits of environmental protection exceed its

47. See KOMESAR, supra note 45, at 15–20 (elaborating the problems with such “singleinstitutional” analysis).
48. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007) (“The risk of catastrophic harm,
though remote, is nevertheless real. That risk would be reduced to some extent if petitioners received
the relief they seek. We therefore hold that petitioners have standing to challenge EPA’s denial of
their rulemaking petition.”); Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000) (“The relevant
showing for purposes of Article III standing, however, is not injury to the environment but injury to
the plaintiff. To insist upon the former . . . is to raise the standing hurdle higher than the necessary
showing for success on the merits . . . .”).
49. See supra note 13.
50. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1495, 1547 (“Asymmetries of interest and activity in the political realm between concentrated and
organized polluters and the dispersed and difficult-to-organize general public are inherent in the
environmental domain.”); Sunstein, Standing, supra note 43, at 219; Wendy Wagner, The
Participation-Centered Model Meets the Administrative Process, 2013 WISC. L. REV. 671, 680–81
(“This complete absence of public interest representation in at least half of the public-oriented rules
provides particularly compelling evidence of participatory imbalances.”); Matthew D. Zinn, Policing
Environmental Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 130
(“Advocates of diffuse interests such as environmental protection face acute public-goods problems
in the enforcement setting.”).
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costs. 51 This is hardly a sufficient basis for substituting the decisions of
courts for the decisions of expert administrative agencies in all cases; in
fact, courts may be susceptible to similar minoritarian biases.52
Nevertheless, it is a plausible basis for relaxing the simplistic assumptions
of the representation-centered theory in at least some environmental cases,
especially those brought on behalf of diffuse interests. The Court’s
frequent (though hardly uniform) willingness to bless broad, publicinterest remedies in environmental cases may reflect this logic.
The same goes for the casual disregard that both the Supreme Court
and lower courts have shown for the plaintiff-protective principle. Like
broad remedial orders in environmental cases, injunctions that violate this
principle should be highly suspect under the representation-centered
theory. They clearly implicate the interests of parties not represented
before the Court, which under the representation-centered theory, should
be left to the political process. Indeed, if the plaintiff’s interest really is
broadly shared by a large class of non-parties, the representation-centered
theory suggests that such cases do not belong in court at all. They should
be left to the political process.
And yet, as with broad environmental remedies, there is ample
reason to distrust the political process in at least some of the cases in
which courts have issued universal injunctions. More precisely, there is
ample reason to distrust the political process in practically all cases. The
real question is whether courts are likely to do any better. In at least some
of the universal injunction cases, there is a plausible argument that they
are.
Take the recent travel-ban cases. The persons burdened, directly or
indirectly, by each of President Trump’s successive orders are largely
members of a minority religious group against which there is a widespread
and strongly held prejudice. Members of this group are clearly not without
political allies, as the suits brought by various state attorneys general
attest. Opposition to the President’s promised travel ban was also a major
issue in the recent presidential campaign. But that is hardly adequate
assurance against serious political malfunction where the conditions are
51. See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 45, at 55–56 (“In this scenario, the small, concentrated,
interest groups have substantially greater political influence than groups larger in number but with
smaller per capita stakes . . . .”); Jonathon R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the
Theory of the Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 49–50 (1988) (noting the “significant
influence by interest groups on the specific nature and implementation of
the environmental programs”); Sunstein, Standing, supra note 43, at 219; see generally MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
52. See generally Neil Komesar & Wendy Wagner, The Administrative Process and its
Discontents, ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming) (discussing this issue at length).
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ripe for majoritarian bias, as they were here.53 This supplies the basis for
a classic Democracy and Distrust-style argument for courts to step in.
Of course, much more would be needed to make such an argument
persuasive. Even where the political process is afflicted with serious
majoritarian bias, the courts might do worse. It is also possible that the
crude rule embodied by the representation-centered theory has advantages
over a more flexible standard. 54 But we need not take sides on these
questions for present purposes. The important point is that the Supreme
Court’s willingness to countenance a preliminary injunction that clearly
violated the plaintiff-protective principle might well have rested, in part,
on this sort of comparative institutional calculus. The same goes for the
district judges who issued broad injunctions in the various travel ban cases
in the first instance. More generally, the disconnect between Article III
standing and scope of remedies doctrine may reflect a conscious or
unconscious intuition that the representation-centered theory would have
pernicious effects if taken all the way to its logical conclusion at the
remedial stage. We do not suggest that this is necessarily the case, merely
that it represents a plausible and charitable interpretation of the available
evidence.
Before closing, we should acknowledge that some of the most
important recent criticisms of overly broad injunctions do not sound in the
representation-centered theory or even in the constitutional separation of
powers. Samuel Bray, for instance, criticizes universal injunctions for
encouraging forum shopping; impoverishing the factual record of
important cases on appeal; and short-circuiting the process of deliberative
“percolation” in the lower courts. 55 These are weighty and important
considerations, which may well counsel against expansive use of the
universal injunction. They do not, however, have anything to do with
representation or even with the allocation of power between the courts and
the political process.
We can see this clearly by considering which judicial powers Bray
does not object to. He does not object to the power of the Supreme Court
to establish nationally binding precedents that will often achieve the same
practical effect as a universal injunction. Nor does he object to the power
53. See KOMESAR, supra note 45, at 83 (identifying widely shared prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities as a catalyst for majoritarian bias); see also ELY, supra note 40, at 78–84
(explaining the role of widely held prejudice in disrupting the usual interest-group bargaining of
pluralist politics).
54. See Bray, supra note 30, at 481 (“Although in theory a standard would allow for the
possibility of national injunctions in appropriate situations, in practice the use of a standard would be
seriously deficient.”).
55. See Bray, supra note 30, at 8–15.
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of the lower courts to certify classes or simply to enjoin the same
government action in a large aggregation of individual cases. 56 He is, in
other words, fully comfortable with the courts exercising law-making
power in ways that violate—or are in significant tension with—the
representation-centered theory. His objection to universal injunctions is
simply an argument about how the courts can best exercise this
authority. 57 That argument may well be correct, though we suspect that
there are cases where the countervailing benefits of universal
injunctions—speed, clarity, and uniformity—might justify their use. At
any rate, we believe that Bray is arguing from far more solid footing than
proponents of the representation-centered theory.
CONCLUSION
The representation-centered theory underlying modern standing
doctrine has clear implications for the scope of remedies. If the judicial
power to decide cases is constitutionally limited to particularized injuries
that set the plaintiff apart from the general population, the remedial power
of the federal courts should be similarly limited to that which is necessary
to remedy the plaintiff’s particularized injury. Yet U.S. Courts, including
the Supreme Court, have routinely ignored this straightforward logic.
Some have reacted to this apparent inconsistency with alarm. We are more
sanguine. The representation-centered theory rests on flawed and oversimplistic institutional assumptions. The willingness of courts to disregard
it at the remedial stage—and in several other contexts—bespeaks a
healthy skepticism of reformers wielding abstractions. 58 We recognize
that this is a large claim and do not pretend to have fully substantiated it
in this brief symposium essay. If we have opened a conversation, that is
enough for now.

56. See id. at 56 (“[T]he way to resolve legal questions for nonparties is through precedent, not
through injunctions.”); id. at 57 (“Nothing about the analysis here precludes a Rule 23(b)(2) class
action”). Bray also candidly concedes that his pragmatic case against universal injunctions does not
apply to injunctions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court. Personal Conversation with Samuel Bray,
UCLA Professor of Law, Tucson, Arizona (Oct. 5, 2017). Bray still believes such injunctions are
unconstitutional but purely for originalist, rather than institutional, reasons. Id.; Bray, supra note 30,
at 53 (grounding the plaintiff-protective principle in an originalist reading of Article III).
57. Id. at 60 (discussing the choice between national injunctions and the plaintiff-protective
rule as a matter of “competing policy considerations”).
58. Cf. Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576, 642 (2015) (“[M]y
argument is conservative, in the classical or Burkean sense: it seeks to defend the stability of a
longstanding practice against the threat posed by reformers wielding an abstraction.”).

